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The Principle of Self-Determination
in International Law
The principle of self-determination has widely been invoked in recent
years, especially by spokesmen of countries which have, until lately, been
under foreign domination. Broadly speaking, this principle has two con-
notations-the internal and the external. The internal aspect implies the
right of the people of a state already recognized by international law to
determine their own form of government. The external aspect concerns
itself with the right of a people to determine their nationality and statehood.
This paper is devoted exclusively to the study of self-determination in the
latter context. Is self-determination a legal right backed by legal obliga-
tions? Its moral basis has been recognized widely, but its validity in
international law is still disputed.
Although politically this principle found specific formulation in President
Wilson's famous Fourteen Points announced in 1917, there was. no men-
tion of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Even in the period
between the two World Wars, the principle found no recognition in in-
ternational law, as was amply demonstrated in the Aaland Islands case.
This archipelago, inhabited mainly by Swedes, became a part of the new
Finnish State which was established after Finland broke away from Russia
in November 1917. Sweden demanded the right of self-determination for
the Aalanders. But the Commission of Jurists, which was appointed by the
Council of the League in 1920 to give an opinion on certain objections
raised by Finland, declared categorically: "Positive international law does
not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves
from the State of which they form a part by the simple expression of a
wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a
separation."1
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Again in 1944, self-determination received no mention in the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals. At the suggestion of the Soviet Union, the San Francisco
Conference rephrased Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter, laying
down as one of the purposes of the organisation, "to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace." Similarly, Article 55 also refers to
self-determination as a principle rather than a right, and as ancillary to
peaceful and friendly relations among nations.
There has been much difference of opinion among jurists with regard to
the question whether the Charter creates legal obligations for member
states with respect to human rights. Some authorities, such as Professor
Lauterpacht, have held the view that the international legality of human
rights is derived from the fact that they prominently figure in the statement
of the purposes of the United Nations; and that members are under a legal
obligation to act in accordance with these purposes. 2 Another school of
thought holds that human rights in the Charter have no juridical character,
and do not constitute legal norms under positive law.3
Self-determination, however, falls into a category of its own. The Char-
ter does not bracket self-determination with the other human rights, but
subordinates it to the development of friendly relations among nations. The
lack of legal validity of self-determination is further borne out by the fact
that it was not even listed among the rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 4 which, though not a legally binding in-
strument, did serve to lay down the minimum standard which States were
expected to achieve. This lack of precise definition of the term
self-determination as a human right, makes it difficult to believe that the
Charter could have intended to introduce a new concept into positive
international law, rather than uphold the principle as a political and moral
force.5
This ambiguous position did not obtain long. During the fifth session of
the General Assembly, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia submitted a propo-
sal6 in the Third Committee, which became the basis of an Assembly
2H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, London, 1950, pp. 145-8. See
also Paul Guggenheim, Trait deDroit International Public, Geneva, 1953, pp. 298-305; and
M. Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights, Geneva, 1962, pp. 116- 119.3Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, Princeton, 1968,
pp. 129- 133, 175; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, London, 1950, pp. 29-33;
P. Drost, Human Rights as Legal Rights, Leyden, 1965, pp. 28-29.4Resolution of the General Assembly 217 A (111) dated 10 December 1948.
5Self-determination did not figure in the Bill of Rights which Professor Lauterpacht drew
up in his report to the Human Rights Commission in May 1948, U.N. E/CN.4/89.
6U.N. A/C.3/L.88.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 3
Principle of Self-Determination in International Law
resolution calling on the Economic and Social Council "to request the
Commission on Human Rights to study ways and means which would
ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination."-7 In Febru-
ary 1952, the General Assembly adopted another resolution by which it
determined "to include in the International Covenant or Covenants on
Human Rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to
self-determination in reaffirmation of the principle enunciated in the Char-
ter of the United Nations. This article shall be drafted in the following
terms: 'All peoples shall have the right of self-determination.' "
Thus, self-determination as a "right" rather than a "principle" gained
recognition and was reaffirmed as such in various United Nations resolu-
tions. In 1960, the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples proclaimed: "All peoples have the right to
self-determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine their politi-
cal status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment." 9 The two Covenants on Human Rights adopted by the General
Assembly in December 1966, also lay down the right of self-determination
in identical terms. They further declare: "the States parties to the present
Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." 10
But these developments in the United Nations do not conclusively
establish self-determination as a right in positive international law. What-
ever legal force self-determination could derive in future would be from the
Covenants on Human Rights when they come into force, and then too,
only between the parties to these instruments.
Even in the Covenants, the status of self-determination is not free from
ambiguity. This right stands in a class by itself, as compared to the other
substantive rights enumerated, in the sense that it applies to collectives and
not to individuals, as in the case with all other economic and political
rights. Self-determination cannot be applied to individuals, but has been
understood as being exercised either by whole peoples of a territory seek-
ing freedom from colonial rule, or by substantial groups markedly dis-
tinguished from the remainder of the community in which they live by
virtue of their physical characteristics, habitual language,, religious belief or
political affiliations.
7General Assembly Resolution 421 D(V), 4 December 1950.
8General Assembly Resolution 545 (VI), 5 February 1952.
9General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
'°General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966.
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In order to establish self-determination as an effective right, it is neces-
sary to reach a scientific and objective definition of the word "peoples" to
which it is applicable. But no such definition has been given in the two
Covenants. Another anomaly is that the article on self-determination has
been included in identical terms in both the Covenants, although these are
clearly distinct from one another in their character: the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights recognises certain rights as already existent, and im-
poses upon States the legal obligation to enforce them; whereas the Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may be defined as a
"promotional" instrument which binds its signatories to take steps to
achieve progressively the specified rights.
In other words, it is recognised that the standards laid down are in-
capable of immediate implementation. This incompatibility between the
two Covenants, and the inclusion of self-determination in both, makes its
character ambiguous. Furthermore, the provision on self-determination is
included in the operative part of the Covenants, but it manifests a pre-
ambular character by the fact that it precedes Part II which lays down
general rules governing implementation. The position of the article on
self-determination has given rise to the view that the provisions on imple-
mentation do not apply to Part I (self-determination)."
A further analysis of the Covenants brings out two other aspects which
add to the vagueness surrounding the nature of this right: first, parties are
called upon to promote and respect this right (and not respect and ensure it
as they are called upon to do in the case of other civil and political rights);
secondly, self-determination is the only right mentioned in the Covenants,
respect for which has been qualified by "the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations."
This leads to the conclusion that self-determination is not recognised as
an absolute right by the Covenants. In order to determine the cases in
which the right would be applicable, and the form it would take, it is
necessary to refer to United Nations practice and the preparatory work
involved in the drafting of the Covenants. 12 Further insight can be gained
from the records of the Special Committee on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, which
was set up by the General Assembly in 1963 to draft a report for the
11E. Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of Decem-
ber 1966, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; Proceedings of the Seventh
Nobel Symposium, Oslo, 1967, p. 111.12Discussions on this issue took place in the Human Rights Commission, the Economic
and Social Council, and in the Third Committee and the plenary meetings of the General
Assembly.
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progressive development and codification of the seven principles laid down
by the Assembly. One of these was the principle of equal rights and
self-determination.1 3 The major question which emerged is whether
self-determination is confined to colonial situations alone, or should be
applied also by governments to people living within their territorial jurisdic-
tion. In other words, does international law recognise the right of secession
as a corollary to the right of self-determination?
The question of secession in the context of the right of self-
determination had been anticipated even at the San Francisco Confer-
ence. The consensus which emerged, and as reported by the Committee
charged with the drafting of Chapter I of the Charter, was: "Concerning
the principle of self-determination, it was strongly emphasized on the one
side that this principle corresponded closely to the will and desires of the
peoples everywhere, and should be clearly enunciated in the Chapter; on
the other side it was stated that the principle conformed to the purposes of
the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of
peoples and not the right of secession. '14
In the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the move for the
inclusion of an article on the right of self-determination in the Human
Rights Covenant was spearheaded by the Soviet Union and supported by
the Afro-Asian countries. Since it was directed mainly against the colonial
Powers, there developed a clear trend that self-determination was appli-
cable in the cases of non-self-governing territories only. In fact, many
representatives who opposed the inclusion of the right of self-determination
in the Human Rights Covenants on the ground that it would allow certain
powerful nations to work for the disintegration of other nations, by in-
stigating artificial separatist movements within peoples united by mutual
consent, were told by the Afro-Asian spokesmen that self-determination
did not imply the right of secession.
Faced with the problem of powerful minorities demanding autonomy,
these newly emerging countries were most vehement in denying that the
right of secession was a corollary of the right of self-determination. They
insisted that this right did not apply to minorities living within a state, since
t*heir interests were protected by the provisions on minorities in various
international instruments. Thus, the representative of Iraq declared that
1 3The Special Committee was set up by Resolution 1966(XV111) dated 16 December
1963. Resolution 1815(XVI1) dated 18 December 1962 listed the following principles of
international law for discussion: I) Threat of use of force; 2) peaceful settlement of disputes;
3) non-intervention; 4) cooperation; 5) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 6)
sovereign equality of States; 7) good faith.14 UNC10, Documents, Volume 6, Document 343, pp. 296-7.
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"the right of self-determination applied to a people under foreign domina-
tion, whether it could be defined as a nation or not, but not to a separatist
movement within a sovereign State." 15 Iran also maintained that "the right
of self-determination must never be confused with the right of secession.'
16
Many of the Western Powers opposed the inclusion of an article on
self-determination in the Covenants, on the ground that it was a political
problem which should be tackled by political machinery rather than by a
judicial body. They further argued that if self-determination were not to be
recognised as a universal principle applicable to all peoples, but was to be
interpreted as a right pertinent only to non-self-governing territories, it did
not warrant inclusion in legal instruments such as the Covenants on Hu-
man Rights. The Covenants were designed to lay down rights which were
universally acceptable, while self-determination confined to a colonial con-
text, was limited to situations recognised as being of a transitory character
by Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter.
This weighty argument forced the supporters of the right of
self-determination to accept it as a universal principle, thus adding a new
dimension to the whole problem, the complexity of which was accurately
summed up by the British representative in the Third Committee: "The
draft Covenants were legal texts, imposing definite obligations on
States ... and under Article 40 (Article 41 of the Covenant) a complaint
could be brought against them (States) before the Human Rights Com-
mittee. That Committee consisting of nine men (the Covenant finally pro-
vides for eighteen) selected for their experience of human rights rather than
of statesmanship, would then rule on claims which the States complained
against had been unable to settle by patient statecraft. The claims would be
many, for the right of self-determination meant in essence that any group
which could be regarded as a people should be free to choose the govern-
ment under which it wished to live. It would thus apply to all the many
situations involving disputed territory, claims by a group on one side of a
border to be united to brethren on the other side, and claims by minor-
ities...-The concept of self-determination could not be whittled down to
exclude minorities or groups wishing to secede; its great force lay precisely
in the fact that it was all-embracing. He therefore wondered, in view of the
many areas of the world where questions involving the issue of
self-determination arose or could arise, whether even States having no
colonies were indeed prepared to face the consequences of assuming a
15 U.N. A/C.3/SR.671, 25 November 1955.
'
6U.N. A/C.3/SR.888, 21 November 1958.
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legal obligation to promote the right of self-determination within their
borders ."17
This issue failed to be resolved in the Third Committee of the General
Assembly and in the Economic and Social Council, basically due to the
political approach of most representatives, especially from the Socialist and
the Afro-Asian countries, which was not conducive to a solution within the
legal context. Apart from the USSR and Yugoslavia 8 who accepted in
principle the right of secession of a group within a sovereign state, no other
member proclaimed itself in favour of this right. Neither was any attempt
made to lay down a legal and scientific definition of the term "peoples."
The Covenants on Human Rights, with their ambiguous article on the right
of self-determination, were adopted by the General Assembly with the
backing of the Afro-Asian, Latin American and Socialist states-
significantly states which have expressed dissatisfaction with modern in-
ternational law which is largely a product of the European State system of
the last few centuries.
However, a clearer concept of self-determination has emerged in the
Special Committee on the Principles of International Law, which is essen-
tially a legal body. By its terms of reference, the Special Committee's
function is to formulate declarations on various principles which would not
be legally binding, but which, combined with other instruments of legal
validity, would contribute to the codification and progressive development
of international law. In the Special Committee, it was generally agreed that
the right of self-determination was directly relevant to the emancipation of
colonial people, but it could not be limited to colonial situations. Hence,
the need was recognized to define the criteria of applicability of this right,
since its indiscriminate application could lead to the disruption of the
international order.
It is interesting to note that there was broad agreement on the principle
that the right of self-determination could not constitute a license for seces-
sion to disrupt the national unity and territorial integrity of sovereign
states. But no agreement could be reached on how to balance the right of
self-determination as a universal principle, with the maintenance of the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of states. The Afro-Asians, more ap-
prehensive of demands for secession by national minorities, were sus-
picious of any reference to self-determination in the context of national
states.19 But in the colonial context they demanded that colonial rule be
17 U.N. A/C.3/SR.642, 24 October 1955.
1 8Statement of the Soviet representative in U.N. A/C.3/SR.372 and the Yugoslav draft
resolution in the Human Rights Commission, U.N. E/CN.4/L.22 dated 15 April 1952.
19 U.N. A/AC.125/SR.68 and 69.
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declared illegal, that people under colonial domination be authorized to use
force and invite outside help to secure self-determination, and that colonial
Powers be prohibited from using force against subjugated colonies. 20
On the other hand, the Western powers, chiefly the United States and
Britain, insisted that self-determination be applied not only to a colony, a
non-self-governing territory, a Trust Territory, a zone of military occupa-
tion but also to "a territory which is geographically distinct and ethnically
or culturally diverse from the remainder of the territory of the State
administering it." But in the proposals which they submitted, these powers
added that "States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and pos-
sessed of a representative government, effectively functioning as such with
respect to all distinct peoples within their territory, shall be considered to
be conducting themselves in conformity with this principle as regards to
those peoples." '21 The Afro-Asian members of the Special Committee
opposed the inclusion of this article because they feared that even these
provisions in an international instrument would encourage secessionist
movements.
The Special Committee has yet to resolve this dilemma. But given the
strength of Afro-Asian opposition to the proposal that the right of
self-determination be specifically defined as being applicable in the national
context, it seems unlikely that an article along such lines would be included
in the draft declaration. United Nations practice has been to limit the scope
of this right. Thus, in the Congo crisis of 1960, no consideration was given
whatsoever to the Katangese claim to self-determination. Even the
Afro-Asian world has tended to accept the colonies which have emerged as
international personalities as afait accompli, and has not questioned their
legal status though they were arbitrarily carved out.
Self-determination has been taken to apply to political units which con-
stituted colonies. And it has been understood that once this right has been
exercised by the inhabitants of a colony at the time of the departure of the
colonial ruler, it is not considered feasible to grant it to smaller units within
that framework. This has been borne out by the absence of Afro-Asian
sympathy for Morocco's claim to Mauritania, Iraq's claim to Kuwait and
Biafra's efforts to secede from the Nigerian Federation.
This leads to the conclusion that self-determination in international law
is viewed to be synonymous with the right of non-self-governing territories
20Proposals on self-determination submitted by Czechoslovakia U.N. A/AC.125/L.16;
12 Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia, U.N. A/AC.125/L.31; and 4 Socialist countries
U.N. A/AC. 125/L.74.21Proposals on self-determination submitted by the United States U.N. A/AC.125/L.32
and the United Kingdom U.N. A/AC. 125/L.44.
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to independence. Such territories can easily be distinguished by virtue to
their being geographically and racially distinct from the metropolitan coun-
try which governs them, but with which these territories do hiot share
political power. If international law were to go beyond this 'and recognize
the right of self-determination as transcending legally established in-
ternational boundaries, it would undermine the stability of the international
order by placing it in a perpetual state of flux. It would also destroy (he
premise on which international law operates, viz., respect for the national
unity and territorial integrity of States. This has led to the following
observation by a writer on international law: "Self-determination refers to
the right of the majority within a generally accepted political unit to the
exercise of power. In other words, it is necessary to start with stable
boundaries and to permit political changes within them." 22
Furthermore, self-determination is a political principle, and even if it is
given a legal garb by being incorporated into legal instruments, it would be
difficult to enforce it as a legal right; and it is doubtful whether a judicial
body would agree to adjudicate an issue purely on the basis of this right.
The attitude of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning
the Right of Passage over Indian Territory is most revealing. Among other
actions to justify its conduct in impeding Portuguese passage over Indian
territory, India advanced the claim of the right of self-determination of the
population of the Portuguese enclaves. 23 In its final submission, Portugal
specifically asked the Court, inter alia, "to hold that the arguments of India
set out above under A, B and C are without foundation" (B related to "the
application of the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to
human rights and the right of self-determination of peoples"). 24 But the
Court circumvented this fundamental question by declaring that "it is no
part of the judicial function of the Court to declare in the operative part of
its judgment that any of those arguments is or is not well-founded. ' 25
22 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs
of the United Nations, London, 1963, p. 104.23
1CJ Pleadings, Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Vol. 11,
Counter-Memorial of the Government of India, p. 151. Vol. I11, Rejoinder of the Govern-
ment of India, pp. 305-6. Vol. IV, Argument of Professor C.H.M. Waldock, Counsel of the
Government of India, pp. 857-60.24 1CJ Reports 1960, Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory, pp.
16-19.
2,5d., at 32.
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